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During the period of cold war, NATO alliance was producing defence commodity 
to protect its members from the common threat of ex-Soviet Union. The paper examines 
the problem of burden sharing among NA TO allies. It is shown that larger countries are 
benefited more than smaller countries from the production of the public good i.e defence, 
if the income elasticity of marginal utility of income is greater than one in absolute value, 
Complete demand systems are employed for estimating the income elasticity of marginal 
utility of income. 
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Introduction 
Since the seminar paper of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), (OZ), on the economic 
theory of alliances, much work on the theoretical and empirical aspects of the al-
location behaviour of alliance members appeared in the literature. Two are the 
main implications of the OZ model; namely, suboptimal provision of the defe nce 
commodity and disproportional sharing of the common defence burden. Specifi-
cally, in the OZ model the defence commodity is a public good; the cost functions 
for the production of the defence commodity are linear and the same for all allies; 
and the alliance members behave noncooperativelly. Then, an unequal burden is 
inevitable because the larger nations have little barganing power to increase the 
contributions of the smaller members. Therefore, the smaller nations "free ride" 
on their defence efforts and the alliance public good is provided because larger 
nations, mainly the United States, have an interest in it. As a result of this, allies 
with greater wealth (population etc.) bear a disproportionate share of the common 
defence burden compared to that of a less wealthy allies. In addition, the free riding 
hypothesis implies the suboptimal provision of the alliance public good. 
Extending the OZ model by relaxing some of its assumptions, many studies 
showed that the free riding problem was overestimated in the OZ model. Specifi-
cally, relaxing the pure assumption of alliance's good, van Yperse de Strihou (1967), 
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Sandler and Forbes (1980), Murdoch and Sandler (1982, 1984), proved that as 
the percentage of private benefits increases as a percentage to total alliance good 
production, free-rider tendencies will decrease. Thus, the more private benefits 
alliant nations receive as a result of their contributions to the alliance defence 
provision. Another aspect of the problem is examined by Boyer (1989), where 
nations specialize in the production of those alliance goods (economic, political, 
and military) for which they possess comparative advantage. Finally, Weber and 
Wiesmeth (1989) emphasize a closer cooperation (stronger integration) among 
NATO member which implies an optimal provision of the public defence com-
modity. They present a political environment which allows efficient and equitable 
burden sharing in NATO. 
Among empirical studies, Gonzalez and Mchay (1991) find more support for the 
cooperative view of ally relationships than that of the OZ noncooperative model. 
On the other hand, Sandler and Murdoch (1989), using a system of simultaneous 
equations for a sample of ten NATO allies for the 1956-1987 period, find empirical 
support for Nash-Cournot behaviour for the NATO members. 
In this paper, the NATO decision making process is represented as a cooperative 
game. Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that stronger integration (cooperation) 
characterizes more appropriately international military alliances like NATO. A 
general result is derived and it implies that the disproportionate burden sharing 
in NATO is explained by the progressiveness of the benefit the NATO members 
derive from the alliance public good. Larger nations tend to derive more benefit 
than smaller nations for a given amount of the public good, and therefore, contrib-
ute more to the provision of the public commodity. This explains why apparently 
inequitable alliance military burdens could be acceptable within the alliance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the theoreti-
cal framework is developed. In Section III, the empirical model is presented and 
the empirical findings are analyzed. Finally, concluding remarks follow in the last 
section. 
The Theoritical Framework 
We define NATO to be an international regime with n member states, belong-
ing to the set N. In this regime, there is one public good x, defence, and one private 
good y (income). Each individual member i , i EN, has a preference relation ordering 
over feasible pairs (x,y). The preference relation is represented by a utility function 
Ui: R~--j- R. Each member state i EN is endowed with a positive amount Wi of the 
private good (i.e. the endowment may represent a country's gross national product 
(GNP) etc.). Moreover, each member contributes t i E [0, wd as an input towards the 
provision of the public good, and the cost functions are linear and the same for all 
member nations with x = J(t), t: 2: ti , and J(O) = O. It is assumed that the utility 
iEN 
function U(X,yi) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly monotone and strictly 
concave. Moreover, the function Ui is the same for each iE N , and Ui is additively 
separable, u(x,y,) = vex) + h(yi), with Vx > 0, Ily >0. 
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As in Weber and Wiesmeth (1989), it is assumed that a supranational agency 
prescribes a proportional burden sharing on NATO. Given this institutional envi-
ronment, individual members decide upon their contribution towards the provision 
of the public defenoe commodity. Then we have to discuss the problem of selecting 
appropriate outcomes among the feasible allocations. Thus, given that NATO is 
characterized by a strong integration among its members, its decision making can 
be represented as a cooperative game. 
Let r = {N,L,(Ui)i EN} be a game, with N the set of the n NATO memhers as 
players, L the set of all feasible allocations, and Ui the playoff function of player i, 
that is u;(x) = u;(f(x), OJi - qJi(X», qJ E <I> where <I> is the set of all proportional cost shar·· 
ing methods. For any a, bEL, we say that b S-dominates a if and only ifui(b»ui(a) 
Vi EScN. A proposal is a pair (i,x) such that iEN andxEL. The set of all proposals 
made by i and not rejected by the other members is defined as follows: 
6(i,x): = {(i,x)ENxLI? x' EL(S) s.t. x' S-dominatesxVScN/{i}} 
Then, the set of "best" proposals for player i is given by: 
8(i,x): = {(i,x)E6(i,x) I argmax. Ui(X)} 
The solution oUhe game r is defined by: C (i,x ) = U (3 (i ,x ). That is, the set 
iEN 
C(i,x) consists of all maximal not "objectionable" proposals, and, therefore, each 
one of these proposals has a likelihood to be selected as the final outcome of the 
decision making by the n NATO members. 
Proposition 1 If the decision making in NATO is presented by the game r, then 
C(i,x) = 0 . Specifically, the unique solution of game r is given by C(i,x') = (1,x), 
.. . , (n,x'), where (j(t'), t;, ... , t;,) is a Lindahl allocation, with cost shares t; = 'Pi(X') 
"liEN. 
proof 
From Mas-ColeU and Silvestre (1989, Proposition 1 and 2), it is known that 
there is one to one ·correspondence between a linear cost share equilibrium and 
Lindahl equilibrium. The equivalence theorem of Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) 
implies that any core allocation is a qJ-CSE. Therefore, given the proportionality 
assumption, the above-mentioned results imply that an allocation is in the core of 
the game r, say C(r), iff it is a Lindahl equilibrium. Our assumptions on preference 
and production guarantee the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium (Foley, 1970). By 
definition 6(i,x)C;;;C(r), which implies C(i,x)c;;;C(r). II 
This proposition shows that the decision in NATO can cope with the efficiency 
problem, usually associated with Nash equilibria in noncooperative environments. 
It is also appropriate to deal with issues of disproportionate burden sharing as we 
can see in the next proposition. 
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Proposition 2 Let (t{, ... , t~) be a solution of game r . Then for any two member 
t' t* 
nations i andj with Wi > Wj we have: -.L > _L if and only if I a I > 1, where a is the 
Wi OJ j 
elasticity of marginal utility of income with respect to income .. 
proof 
From the assumption on utility functions and proposition 1, we know that: ti = 
Vx . t. px, where p = -. Let Bi = --'---, then 
hy Yi 
Since a = Yi hyy , equation (1) becomes: 
hy 
aB; x [( )] 
-=--2 pa+1 . 
Byi Yi 
Therefore, relation (2) implies: aBi > 0 if a < --1. .. 
. By; 
(1) 
(2) 
Thus, proposition 2 implies that if the decision making among NATO members 
is described by game r, then cost-burden, as proportion of income, rises with income 
if the elasticity of marginal utility of income is greater than one in absolute terms. 
This provides an explanation of disproportionate burden sharing since the benefits 
from the public good as a proportion of income rise with income whenever I a I > 1, 
which may nullify the tax progressivity. 
Estimation and Results 
Empirical consumer demand studies provide estimates of the parameter 1jJ , 
which is called the "money (or income) flexibility" (Frisch, 1959). Its reciprocal is 
the income elasticity of marginal utility of income, i.e. a = 1!1jJ. Frisch has speculated 
on the welfare implications of 1jJ. However, Sato (1972) has shown that 1jJ has no 
intrisic cardinal properties. 
To obtain estimates of 1jJ, a cross-country demand model is used; namely, the 
Working-Preference Independence (WPI) model, as parameterized by Theil et a1. 
(1989). Given m-goods and n-countries, the WPI model is given by: 
wiJ = A +B.+ C (3) 
where: 
A = ai + biqj (real-income term), 
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W;j is the budget share of good i for country j; qj is the logarithm of real income 
n 
per capita of country j , qj = 1 + qj, and logpi = L logpij is the geometric mean of 
j~l 
prices across countries for good i. The a's and P's satisfy the following constraints: 
Lai =l,LPi = 0. 
The NATO members are: the United States, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal, Iceland and Turkey. Since consumption expenditures in different 
countries are expressed in different currencies, these can be converted into a com-
mon currency, say U.S. dollars. However, this method has serious disadvantages (see 
Theil et al., 1989). To avoid this problem, Kravis and his colleagues at the University 
of Pennsylvania, applied the Geary-Khamis method (Theil et al., 1989)to obtain 
data for the countries included in the International Comparison Project (ICP) at 
various phases. These data sets are reported in Theil et al. (1989). Due to lack of 
data Iceland and Turkey have been omitted. The data for the remaining fourteen 
countries were obtai.ned from Theil et al. (1989). The WPI model on years 1980 
and 1986 was estimated using four and six aggregated commodity groups. The six 
good categories are: (1) food, including food, beverages and tobacco, (2) clothing 
and footwear, (3) rent, (4) housing, including furniture, furnishing and household 
equipment and operation, (5) travel and leisure, including transport, communica-
tion, recreation, entertainment, education and culture services, and (6) other goods 
and services. In the four-goods case the aggregated categories are: (1) food , (2) 
rent and housing, (3) travel and leisure, and (4) other goods and services. 
Since Theil et a1. (1989), provide data for the fourteen country-members of 
NATO only in 1980, the data for the 1986 year have been estimated byextrapola-
tion. Specifically, an implicit deflator for each good category was obtained simply 
by dividing the 1986 expenditure in current prices by the expenditure in 1980 prices. 
In some cases, the constant price series was based on a year other than 1980, and 
the series had first to be shifted to the 1980 base for this purpose. Then, each 1986 
price for the goods, was extrapolated from its 1980 counterpart by mUltiplying the 
1980 good price by the price change between 1986 and 1980 as indicated by the 
implicit deflator in the appropriate good category. The per capita expenditures was 
obtained by dividing expenditure on current prices in each category by population 
figures. 
For the statistical estimation of the WPI model, an error term, Ej, added at the 
end of each one of the demand equations. Since LEij =0 for eachj, one of the m 
i 
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equations can be disregarded, say the last. Then the system of m-l equations, given 
by the WPI model, is estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure (Theil 
et aI., 1989). In all cases, the per capita real income is normalized so that the 1980 
(1986) United States per capita real income is equal to one. 
The estimated parameters of the WPI demand model for the years 1980 and 
1986 are reported in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. The estimates of 1/J are all negative, 
as we expert them to be (since 1# has the interpretation as the income elasticity of 
the marginal utility of income) and statistical significant at 5% level of significance. 
In all cases the absolute value of 1/J is less than one, Then the empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that I a I > 1, which implies, in the light of proposition 
2, that more wealthy countries derive greater benefit than less wealthy countries 
from the provision of the public commodity. 
Table 1: Estimates of WPl model in 1980 
Food 
Rent!Housing 
Travel/Leisure 
Other 
Food 
Cloth/Foowear 
Rent 
Housing 
Travel/Leisure 
Other 
0.158 
(0.010) 
0.252 
(0.008) 
0.296 
(0.007) 
0.294 
0.157 
(0.010) 
0.067 
(0.005) 
0.167 
(0.009) 
0.085 
(0.005) 
0.296 
(0.007) 
0.228 
A:,ympotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
I'arametel's estimated 
-0.247 
(0.024) 
0.063 
(0.020) 
0.131 
(0.017) 
0.053 
Six goods 
-0.251 
(0.024) 
-0.025 
(0.009) 
0.045 
(0.020) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.129 
(0.016) 
0.087 
-0.594 
(0.098) 
- 0.530 
(0.067) 
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Table 2: Estimates ofWPI model in 1986 
Food 
Rent/Housing 
TravellLeisure 
Other 
Food 
Cloth/Foowear 
Rent 
Housing 
Travel/Leisure 
Other 
0.146 
(0.009) 
0.312 
(0.015) 
0.246 
(0.014) 
0.296 
0.148 
(0.008) 
0.073 
(0.004) 
0.220 
(0.015) 
0.084 
(0.005) 
0.241 
(0.014) 
0.234 
(0.024) 
Asympotic standard errors are in parentheses" 
--------------------~ 
Parameters I$timated 
-D.224 
(0.017) 
0.126 
(0.029) 
0.035 
(0.027) 
0.063 
- 0.219 
(0.017) 
-D.008 
(0.007) 
0.099 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
0.100 
(0.045) 
-D.no 
(0.168) 
-D.676 
(0.111) 
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Finally, the pooled estimates and their asymptotic standard errors are shown in 
Table 3. Not surprisingly, the estimates tend to be between those of the 1980 and 1986 
years' estimates. Again, the pooled estimator of 1V implies that the income elasticity 
of marginal utility of income is greater than one in absolute value. Therefore, wealthy 
countries have an incentive to bear a disproportionate burden sharing since their ben-
efits depend positively on the amount of the public defence commodity produced. 
Also, estimates of the parameter l/J are derived, using time-series data for NATO 
countries. The time-series version of the WPI-model is given by: 
Llwit =/1iLl (10gQt )+ Wit [ Ll(logpit)- i~l WitLl(log pjt)] + 
+ 1jJ (Wit + fO[ Ll(IOgPit)- i~l (Wit + p\ )Ll(lOgPit)] (4) 
where Ll stands for the fi rst (backward) differences. Q is the real income, 
W +W 1 
and Wit = It Ll- " The log-change in real income is given by the index: 
2 
m 
Ll ( log Qt ) = L Wit Ll (lOgqit ) . 
i~l 
214 European Research Sludies, Volume VI, Issue (3-4), 2003 
._--
Tabl,e 3: Pooled Estimates of WPI model 
Food 
Rent/Housing 
Travel/Leisure 
Other 
Food 
C1oth/Foowear 
Rent 
Housing 
Travel/Leisure 
Other 
a; 
0.150 
(0.009) 
0.253 
(0.007) 
0.300 
(0.006) 
0.297 
0.149 
(0.009) 
0.068 
(0.003) 
0.167 
«(l.O07) 
0.084 
(0.003) 
0.299 
(0.006) 
0.233 
(0.019) 
Alympolic standard errors are in paren theses. 
Parameters estimated 
-0.240 
(0.020) 
0.057 
(0.014) 
0.126 
(0.012) 
0.057 
Six goods 
-0.240 
(0.020) 
-0.019 
(0.006) 
0.041 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.1 20 
(0.012) 
0.087 
(0.039) 
-0.624 
(0.066) 
-0.573 
(0.046) 
The Rotterdam model, developed by Theil (1965), and Barten (1968), provides a 
first order approximation to the demand functions (4). The "relative price" version 
or the Rotterdam model (RRP) is given by the following equations: 
(5) 
The conditions which are required to make the model (5) consistent with the 
theory of demand are: 
(i) adding-up: 
(ii) symmetry: 
(iii) homogeneity: 
m 
2: Yi = 1 
i=l 
m n 
2:2: (~ij ="IjJ 
i=lj=l 
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The above restrictions are not sufficient to ensure the identifiability of the RRP-
model (Theil, 1975). The assumption of preference independence solves this problem. 
To account for that, the following restriction is also imposed on the parameters: 
(iv) additivity: Oij = 0 V i 'F j and Oii = 1f1!i, i = 1, ... , m 
Annual time series data for the period 1960-1989 on personal consumption ex-
penditures and prices were used to estimate the WPI and RRP models. All data are 
based on official estimates of OEeD statistics. Implicit price indices were derived 
by dividing expenditures in current prices by expenditures in constant prices. The 
quantity qit, is the per capita expenditurre on ith commodity divided by its price at 
year t. Following the OEeD classification, the eight aggregated commodity groups 
are: (1) food, beverages and tobacco, (2) clothing and footwear, (3) gross rent, fuel 
and poweer, (4) furniture, furnishings and household equipment and operation, (5) 
medical car~ and health expenses, (6) transport and communication, (7) recreation, 
education and cultural services, and (8) miscellaneous goods and services. 
The time series estimates of 1/J for the NATO countries are given in Table 4. 
All estimates are negative, but for Italy they are statistically insignificant for both 
models. As it can be seen from Table 4, the absolute value of all income flexibili-
ties, for the NATO countries, is less than one. Finally, a pooled time series cross 
sectional data consisting of 14 NATO countries for a four-year period 1970-1973 
has been assembled. The real expenditure and income data are constant 1970 
dollars. The time series cross section estimates of the WPI and RRP models 
are given in Table 5. As it can be seen, the time series cross section estimates of 
the income flexibility, in both models, tend to provide evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that I a I > 1. 
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Table 4: Income Flexibilities 
..... -
Country RRP-model WPI-model 
1/J 1/J 
United States -0.7778 -0.6291 
(0.0632) (0.0583) 
Canada -0.04741 -0.4080 
(0.0647) (0.0648) 
Germany -0.5416 -0.4925 
(0.0877) (0.0834) 
Luxembourg -0.5408 -0.5266 
(0.0851) (0.0811) 
Belgium -0.4082 -0.4481 
(0.0518) (0.0541) 
Denmark - 0.6311 -0.6166 
(0.0654) (0.0646) 
France -0.5898 -0.5349 
(0.0513) (0.0437) 
Netherlands -0.1318 -0.0613 
(0.0602) (0.0654) 
United Kingdom -0.3264 -0.3393 
(0.0719) (0.0731) 
Norway -0.7883 - 0.7640 
(0.0856) (0.0823) 
Italy -0.0646 -0.0869 
(0.0552) (0.0555) 
Spain -0.3043 - 0.3438 
(0.0381) (0.0396) 
Greece -0.3140 -0.2808 
(0.0621) (0.0582) 
Iceland - 0.8886 -0.8131 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Time series-cross section estimates 
Food 
Clothing 
Rent/Fuel 
Housing 
Health 
Transportation 
Recreation 
Food 
Clothing 
Rent/Fuel 
Housing 
Health 
Transportation 
Recreation 
Other 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
FinaJ Remarks 
Yi 
0.1784 
(0.0149) 
0.0860 
(0.0093) 
0.1035 
(0.0106) 
0.1506 
(0.0096) 
0.0715 
(0.0101) 
0.1969 
(0.0140) 
0.0955 
(0.0073) 
0.1176 
Yi 
-0.1216 
(0.0130) 
- 0.0118 
(0.0086) 
-D.0504 
(0.0109) 
0.0487 
(0.0086) 
0.0155 
(0.0078) 
0.0688 
(0.0125) 
0.0284 
(0.0051) 
0.0224 
RRP-model 
WPI-model 
- 0.3173 
(0.0670) 
- 0.4149 
(0.0549) 
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In this paper, the problem of burden sharing for the defence commodity in 
NATO was examined. Assuming a stronger integration among NATO members, 
the NATO decision making process was represcnted as a cooperative game. Then, it 
has been shown that NATO obtains an efficient production level of the public com-
modity. Furthermore, under the assumption of separable utility functions for NATO 
members, it was proven that larger countries benefit more than smaller countries 
from the production of the public good if the income elasticity of marginal utility of 
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income is greater than one in absolute value. Therefore, empirical estimates of the 
income elasticity of marginal utility of income using cross-sectional, time-series and 
pooled estimates were derived. The empirical results found to be robust, indicating 
a value for the income elasticity of marginal utility of income greater than one in 
absolute terms. This provides an explanation of disproportionate burden sharing 
in NATO since the benefits from the public commodity, as proportion of income, 
rise with income, thus favoring the more wealthy nations. 
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